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MAGISTRATES’ COURTS AND THE 2003 REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 





Magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts are the two levels of first instance 
criminal courts in the English criminal justice system.. While in the Crown Courts, 
judges and juries deal with the most serious offences (indictable), magistrates' courts 
try, within a locally based jurisdiction, lesser offences known as summary and "either 
way" offences.
1
 Also, Crown Courts' judges are all professional judges whereas those 
sitting in magistrates' courts most frequently are lay people.  
Magistrates’ courts have been in existence in England and Wales since the 
14th century. The Justices of the Peace Act 1361 is still the source of some of their 
powers. Until 2004 the main pieces of legislation which governed magistrates’ courts, 
their organisation, jurisdiction, powers and procedure were the Domestic Proceedings 
and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978, the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the Police and 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994, the Justices of the Peace Act 1997 and the Access to 
Justice Act 1999.  Two recent pieces of legislation, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and 
the Courts Act 2003 must now be added to that list. 
As Sir Robin Auld, a senior Lord Justice in the Court of Appeal,  pointed out 
in his Report on the Review of the Criminal Courts
2
, “(n)o country in the world relies 
on lay magistrates
3
 as we do (…) to administer the bulk of criminal justice”.
4
 This 
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1 Listed in Schedule 1 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 “either way” offences are triable by either 
court. See also footnotes 84 and 85, and Part 2 on the powers and jurisdiction of magistrates. 
2
 The Auld Report was commissioned by the Lord Chancellor and was published in October 2001. The 
rather daunting (or optimistic) terms of reference for Sir Robin Auld were as follows: “to review… the 
practices and procedures of, and the rules of evidence applied by, the criminal courts at every level, 
with a view to ensuring that they deliver justice fairly, by streamlining all their processes, increasing 
their efficiency and strengthening the effectiveness of their relationship with others across the whole of 
the Criminal Justice system, and having regard to the interests of all parties including victims and 
witnesses, thereby promoting public confidence in the rule of law.” The full report is available at 
http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/ccr-00.htm.  
For early commentaries on this report, see Lord Woolf, “Making sense of the Criminal Justice 
System”, Lecture Paper, 9 October 2001, Criminal Bar Association, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/pre_2004/lcj091001.htm; see also the 
special issue of the Criminal Law Review of April 2002. With particular regards to magistracy, see R. 
Morgan, “Magistrates: The Future According to Auld”, [2002] 29 J. of Law and Society 308; and A. 
Sanders, “Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report”, [2002] 29 J. of Law and Society 324. 
3
 There are about 30,400 of them serving for between 10 and 20 years. Unpaid but receiving a small 
allowance to cover costs and financial loss, they sit part-time in benches of three for a minimum of 26 
half-day court sittings a year.  
4
 See the Report, chapter 4  para.1 at  94. 
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system is also unique
5
 in that lay magistrates and full-time professional judges
6
 rarely 
sit together as a mixed court. This singularly contrasts with other countries, like 
France or Germany, where lay and professional judges exercising the same 
jurisdiction sit together. This also contrasts with Northern Ireland where magistrates 
are all professional judges.  
Whilst extremely important in the number of cases they hear
7
, and hence in the 
number of lives they affect, their work has seldom been the subject of research until 
relatively recently. As Penny Darbyshire has observed, the major contribution of the 
magistracy to the English criminal justice system, and its importance, has been largely 
neglected by most categories of lawyers ranging from superior judges and academics 
to law-makers, including the 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
8
. The 
Runciman Report merely stated that “magistrates’ courts conduct over 93%
9
 of all 
criminal cases and should be trusted to try cases fairly”
10
 without any supporting 
evidence to underpin this assertion.  Darbyshire explains this disregard for the 
magistracy mainly by the fascination that most lawyers have for jury trials
11
. 
This neglect appears to be addressed by the current reforms of the criminal 
justice system and of the courts’ system undertaken by recent Labour Governments. 
Following the publication of the Auld Report and of the Government White Paper 
“Justice for All”, as presented to Parliament on July 2002
12
, the Criminal Justice Bill
13
 
                                                 
5
 However, Magistrates’ courts are not unique to the United Kingdom as such courts can be found in 
other Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand or South Africa. Justices of the Peace are also 
found in Scotland which has a separate legal system from that of England and Wales; however, plans to 
abolish lay justices of the peace were unveiled in a report on Scotland’s justice system: see The 
Summary Justice Review Committee. Report to Ministers (the McInnes Report) (Scottish Executive, 
2004, Edinburgh) available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/justice/sjrcrm-00.asp 
However, it has since been decided that the 400 year old system of lay justice will be retained. The  
courts’ administration will be unified and the sheriff's jurisdiction increased to one year's custody: see 
“Smarter justice, Safer Communities” (22 March 2005) 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/justice/19008/16628 and the Criminal Proceedings etc (Reform) 
(Scotland) Bill introduced on 22 February 2206. 
6
 Called District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts), they handle only 9% of that criminal work sitting alone. 
These were referred to as stipendiary magistrates before the Access to Justice Act 1999, s. 78. 
Interestingly enough South Africa seems to move, under the Magistrates’ Courts Amendment Act, 
towards a system of lay assessors sitting with their professional magistrates; see G. Wilson, “A Legacy 
of the Empire: Lay Assessors in South Africa”, (Sept. 2003) Magistrate, 247. On the other hand, the 
New Zealand Law Commission is expected to recommend the creation of a new layer of courts to 
speed up criminal justice which would not involve justices of the peace; see P. Harkness, “Future of 
New Zealand Lay Magistracy Hangs in the Balance”, (May 2004) Magistrate 147. 
7
 2,039,000 were proceeded against in the magistrates' courts; 80,000 tried at the Crown Court: 
Criminal Statistics England and Wales 2004. In 2000, 1,911,600 defendants had proceedings 
completed there; Home Office 2000/1 Statistical Bulletin at 2. This contrasts with the corresponding 
figure of  95,300 for the Crown Court. 
8
 “An Essay on the Importance and Neglect of the Magistracy”, (1997) Crim L.R. 627, esp. at 637 in 
which the author wittily refers to the “…Royal “Omission” on Criminal Justice” in relation to the 
failure of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice to commission any research into the operation of 
magistrates’ courts. 
9
 This figure seems to vary according to the source of  information between 93 and 98 percent. For a 
discussion of this statistic, see Darbyshire, op. cit. at 628 
10
 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice report, Cm2263, London HMSO 1993 at 88. 
11
 Op. cit. above at 634-640. 
12
 Home Office, Cm 5563 (2003). See also “Analysis, Justice For All”, an interview with Lord 
Falconer, Home Office Minister of State for Criminal Justice and M. Smart, “Sentencing and Law 
Reform”, (October 2002) Magistrate 268, on the role of magistrates in the changes ahead. 
13
 For early analyses of the Bill, see M. Zander, “Lord Woolf’s criticisms of Mr Blunkett’s Criminal 
Justice – Pt I”, (8 Aug. 2003) New Law Journal  1228 and “Lord Woolf’s criticisms of Mr Blunkett’s 
 3 
and the Courts Bill
14
 were tabled before, and debated in, Parliament in the course of 
2002 and received Royal Assent on 20 November 2003.  The Criminal Justice Bill 
was presented by the Home Office as the “most significant overhaul of the criminal 
justice system in a generation.”
15
 The Criminal Justice Act 2003
16
 is indeed, in the 
Government’s view
17
, designed to “modernise and rebalance the system in favour of 
victims, witnesses and communities” and “help tackle and reduce crime – from 
detection to rehabilitation of offenders – by bringing more offenders to justice…”
18
. 
The Act is aimed at introducing measures that will strengthen and extend police 
powers to fight crime, terrorism and organised crime
19
; make the whole justice system 
more efficient, modern and joined up
20
; turn trials into a search for the truth
21
; re-
define the principles and purposes of sentencing and rehabilitation
22
.   
More modestly, the Courts Act
23
 primarily implements the key 
recommendations relating to the courts made by Sir Robin Auld in his report as 
accepted by the Government in the White paper “Justice for All”. Its main purpose is 
to unify the administration of the court system
24
. However, these two Acts combined, 
                                                                                                                                            
Criminal Justice – Pt II”, (15 Aug. 2003) New Law Journal  1264; see also M. Zander, “Mr Blunkett’s 
Criminal Justice Bill”, (6 Dec. 2002) New Law Journal 1861; “The Criminal Justice Bill in the Lords” 
(24 Oct. 2003) New Law Journal 1577; and “The Criminal Justice Bill Gets Royal Assent”, (28 Nov. 
2003) 1778; and with particular reference to magistracy, see G. Robson, “Time to Reflect: A Challenge 
for the lay Magistracy?”,  (1 Nov. 2003) 167 Justice of the Peace 828. 
14
 For early comments, see Lord Woolf, “Achieving Criminal Justice”, (Feb. 2003) Magistrate 42. 
15
 See Home Office Press Release of 21 November 2003, see  http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-
releases/Delivering_Justice_For_All_-Crim 
16
 See G. Robson, “Criminal Justice Act 2003: A Possible Prognosis”,  (3-10 Jan. 2004) 168 Justice of 
the Peace 11 and B. Gibson, “The Criminal Justice Act 2003”, (6 March 2004) 168 Justice of the Peace 
164 and “The Criminal Justice Act 2003- Part 2” (20 March 2004) 168 Justice of the Peace 207. 
17
 Some commentators would identify other motives and criticise the likely attainment of the aims: see 
A. Ashworth [2004] Crim LR 516-533 "Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 2: Criminal Justice Reform - 
Principles, Human Rights and Public Protection;  M. Tonry,"Punishment and Politics", 2004 Willan 
Cullompton, passim. 
18
 See footnote 14. 
19
 Notably by making significant changes to the Police and Criminal Justice Act 1984, restricting the 
right to bail, extending drug testing, extending the maximum period of detention in cases of alleged 
acts of terrorism and making ID fraud arrestable offences. 
20
 Notably by improving joined up working, improving the preparation of cases, making trial more 
efficient in terms of speed and efficacy, using modern technology to give evidence in court and 
improving jury service. 
21
 Essentially by adopting an inclusionary approach to evidence, improving disclosure and limiting the 
application of the double jeopardy rule. 
22
 Primarily by enshrining for the first time those purposes and principles in a statute, establishing a 
new Sentencing Guidelines Council to avoid uncertainty and disparity in sentencing, extending 
magistrates’ sentencing powers and offering serious alternatives to custody. 
23
 See A. Samuels, “Courts Act 2003: What is it all About?” (2003) 167 Justice of the Peace 913. 
24
 Part 1 imposes on the Lord Chancellor a duty to maintain an efficient and effective court system. It 
paves the way for a new unified courts administration as it abolishes the Magistrates’ Courts 
Committees, which were responsible for the administration of the Magistrates’ Courts, and sets up 
local court boards. Part 2 and 3 contains provisions reforming lay justices and magistrates’ courts. Part 
4 aims at improving court security in the Supreme Court, County Courts and Magistrates’ Courts. Part 
5 extends the concept of an Inspectorate of Court Administration, until then limited to magistrates’ 
courts, to all the courts. Part 6 is mainly concerned with judicial titles while Part 7 covers court practice 
and provisions, including criminal procedure rules and family procedure rules which will be made 
respectively by the New Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and Family Procedure Rules 
Committee. Finally the miscellaneous Part 8 notably consolidates the existing powers of the Lord 
Chancellor to set court fees whilst for the first time making their exercise subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny. It also confers new powers to the courts in relation to fine enforcement and to allow them to 
order that some damages take the form of periodical payments in serious personal injury cases.  
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when they come into force and are fully implemented
25
, will have a significant impact 
on the organisation and the powers of Magistrates’ Courts. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the potential impact this reform of 




PART 1 ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT: LESS LOCAL, MORE 
NATIONAL? 
 
The organisation and operation of the magistrates’ courts have been little 
subject to academic enquiry or empirical research until relatively recently
26
. The Le 
Vay Scrutiny of Magistrates’ Courts, which reported in 1989
27
 set out to look at the 
administration of these courts.  The findings were that the system of summary justice 
was fairly haphazard, that courts often operated in isolation, and there was a distinct 
lack of accountability.  It was recommended that the running of the magistrates’ 
courts service should be undertaken by a government agency. This recommendation 
was not implemented, but it was nonetheless clear that the Conservative government 
of the time wished to exercise more control over the way the system was operating.   
In 1992 the Lord Chancellors’ Department
28
 took over the executive 
responsibility for the magistrates’ courts from the Home Office. In the same year, the 
government published a White Paper, A New Framework for Local Justice
29
, which 
introduced measures such as cash limiting and performance related grants of 
resources to courts. More levers for central control were emerging, with reference 




The Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994
31
 was described by Wasik et al
32
 
as “a significant example of the extent to which the demands of efficiency and 
managerialism have had an impact on the criminal justice system”. This Act gave the 
Lord Chancellor increased control over the operation of local justice. Local 
Magistrates’ Courts’ Committees had the task of organising the administration of 
summary justice. By the 1994 Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act, the Lord 
Chancellor was empowered to amalgamate Magistrates’ Courts Committees
33
, 
appoint non magistrate members
34
, direct a Magistrates’ Courts Committee to meet 
certain levels of performance, and even to dismiss its members and replace them for a 
period of three months with members chosen by him. 
35
. 
                                                 
25
 An implementation schedule of criminal justice reforms can be found in Judicial Studies Board, 
“Criminal Justice Reforms Update (Magistrates)” available at http://www.jsboard.co.uk/cjr/index.htm. 
26
 Some notable exceptions being works by P. Carlen, Magistrates’ Justice (London: Martin Robertson, 
1976); D. McBarnett  Conviction (London: Macmillan, 1983) and P. Darbyshire, The Magistrates’ 
Clerk (Chichester : Barry Rose 1984). 
27
 Magistrates’ Courts : Report of a Scrutiny, London 1989 HMSO  
28
 Since June 2003 entitled the Department for Constitutional Affairs. 
29
 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Cm 1829 (London: HMSO 1992). 
30
See M. Wasik,, T. Gibbons, and M. Redmayne, Criminal Justice. Text and Materials (Longman, 
1998) 359 
31
A title criticised for juxtaposing magistrates with the police, an unfortunate resonance with the old 
“police courts”. 
32
 Op. cit., 357 
33
 Now Section 32 of the  Justices of the Peace Act 1997 
34
 Ibid, Section  28 
35
 Ibid, Section 38 
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 A new post of Justices’ Chief Executive was instituted by the 1994 Act.  The 
new appointment was of a person to be in charge of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Committee and to deal with the administrative functions of the courts locally. Before 
that time, the Clerk to the Justices, a qualified lawyer, would have performed this 
function. Section 87 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 removed the requirement that a 
Justices' Chief Executive be legally qualified.  It is made clear in the legislation
36
 that 
the judicial functions of the Clerk to the Justices are not subject to direction by the 
Justices’ Chief Executive.  In the appointment of Justices’ Chief Executives we see 
the beginning of recent moves towards the separation of powers in the running of 
summary justice - administrative duties to be the province of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Committee and Justices’ Chief Executive, legal functions to be exercised by the Clerk 
to the Justices.  Clerks to the Justices continue to exercise certain administrative 
functions, such as arranging the listing of cases. Greater separation of the legal and 
administrative roles was again stressed by the Lord Chancellor in 1997. In a 
Ministerial Statement to the House of Lords
37
’ he spoke of amalgamation of benches 
in the interests of efficiency, and stated that the Lord Chancellor’s Department’s 
objectives were to improve efficiency and reduce delay, and that local justice needed 
a national framework. He also added that there were “…no plans for a replacement of 
the lay magistracy with stipendiary magistrates”. 
In February 1997 a report was produced by a civil servant, Martin Narey, who 
later became Chief Executive of the National Offender Management Service. Entitled 
Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System
38
, widely known as The Narey 
Report, it made many recommendations to speed up criminal justice, notably 
controversial recommendations to remove a defendant’s automatic right to jury trial 
for “either way” offences
39
.   
 
The Auld Review  
The Auld Review recommended, inter alia, that there should be a centrally 
funded executive agency, part of the Lord Chancellor’s Department, to replace the 
Court Service (which then was responsible for the operation of the Supreme Court
40
, 
county courts and some tribunals) and the Magistrates’ Courts Committees.  The 
agency would be responsible for the administration of all criminal courts. Justices’ 
Clerks and legal advisers would continue to be responsible for the legal advice given 
to magistrates, but there should be no growth in the justices’ clerks case management 
jurisdiction
41
, and it is envisaged that the Judicial Studies Board
42
 should take over the 
responsibility for the content and manner of training of magistrates
43
. The Lord 
Chancellor should be more ready to assign a District Judge to an area where, after 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, Section 89 
37
 Made on 29 October 1997.  
38
 (London: Home Office 1997). 
39
 This aspect of the report was not implemented at the time 
40
 By virtue of the Supreme Court Act 1875. This includes the Court of Appeal, High Court, and Crown 
Court sitting in its original capacity - as a court of trial. This is not to be confused with the projected 
new Supreme Court, proposed to replace the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. 
41
 See Chapter 4, para 58. In cases of complexity, or where “robust case management is required”, the 
matter should be put before a District Judge. 
42
 The Judicial Studies Board was established in 1979, and is concerned mainly in delivering judicial 
training, and judicial guidance in the Bench Books.  It also sets the framework for the training of lay 
magistrates (see http://www.jsboard.co.uk). 
43
 Ibid, para 100. 
 6 
consultation, he considers local justice requires this
44
. The Auld Review 
acknowledged problems concerning variations in the delivery of local justice
45
, and 




The Government White Paper Justice for All
47
 
The government accepted certain of Sir Robin Auld’s proposals. The Auld 
review recommendation for a single courts organisation was adopted and it was stated 
that an agency would “deliver decentralised management and local accountability 
within a national framework of standards and strategy direction.”
48
  However, the 
management is going to be much more in central government than previously.  The 
rhetoric is of devolution of power together with accountability, but the anticipated 
reality is of a tightening of national control. Sir Robin Auld’s recommendations for 
mixed benches of lay and professional magistrates, and for an intermediate “middle 
tier” of courts between magistrates and Crown Court were not adopted. 
 
The Courts Act 2003 and management of magistrates’ courts 
The Courts Act seeks further to increase central control over the management of 
the magistrates’ courts. Under Section 1, the Lord Chancellor has the general duty of 
ensuring that there is an “efficient” and “effective”
49
 system of criminal courts.
50
   
First, Magistrates’ Courts Committees are abolished
51
. Instead the Lord 
Chancellor will appoint his local managing body to be known as “Courts Boards”.
52
 
These bodies may be based locally but the policy thrust is for government to achieve 
firmer control of the operation of criminal justice at a local as well as national level. 
The Courts Board would deal with matters concerning not only the magistrates’ 
courts, but also the Crown Court. Thus the Court Boards will deal with all criminal 
courts in the area. There will no longer be a committee dealing exclusively with 
magistrates’ courts’ business.  The Act also provides for the ending of the office of 
Justices’ Chief Executive
53
. Instead the role will belong to a civil servant, designated 
by the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor would also designate an office to be 
responsible for the collection of fines and fees.  The Courts Boards will consider draft 
and final business plans for their area under the guidance of the Lord Chancellor, who 




                                                 
44
 Ibid, para 90 and see Morgan, op. cit. at 315. 
45
 Ibid, paras 34-37. 
46
 Paras 91-97. 
47
 See footnote 12 above. 
48
See Explanatory Notes to Courts Act 2003, 2003 Chapter 39, para. 10, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2003/2003en39.htm 
49
  Both words are very much associated with a  managerial approach. 
50
 Which are defined in Section 68 as Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), and Crown Court and 
magistrates’ court when dealing with any criminal cause or matter. 
51
 See Section 6 - including the Greater London Magistrates’ Courts Authority, which is the 
Magistrates’ Courts Committee for the Greater London area at present. 
52
 See Section 4. Under Schedule 1, each board must have one judge member, two lay magistrates 
(originally it was to be one only), two other members appearing to the Lord Chancellor to have 
knowledge or experience of the courts in the area, and two people representative of the people of the 
area. There may be other members.  
53
 See Section 6(2)(b). The Justices' Chief Executive's role was to deal with the administrative side of 
the magistrates' courts' work.  The post did not involve judicial responsibilities. 
54
  Section 5(3). 
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Secondly, under Part 2 of the Act, magistrates will be appointed to a national, 
unified Bench rather than to a particular, local bench
55
.  Local involvement is 
acknowledged in terminology - what were Commission and Petty Session
56
 areas are 
to be known as “local justice areas”
57
. The Lord Chancellor is empowered to alter 
these areas
58
.  Under Section 10, the Lord Chancellor is responsible for the 
appointment of all lay magistrates. This follows hard on the heels of the legislation 
which gathered all stipendiary (professional) magistrates (now called District Judges 
(Magistrates’ Courts) into a unified Bench
59
.  Under s 2(1), the Lord Chancellor will 
appoint Clerks to the Justices who were previously appointed by the MCC.  Part 5 
provides that a national Inspectorate of Court Administration will oversee both Crown 
and magistrates’ courts, thus ending the role of the Magistrates’ Courts’ Inspectorate, 
which had been established in 1994 by the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act
60
.  By 
Part 6, District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts) would be allowed to sit in the Crown 
Court
61
.  The Explanatory Notes to the Bill pointed out
62
 that this was designed to 
give increased flexibility in judicial deployment
63
. 
It is said that “he who pays the piper calls the tune”. Under the Act
64
 the 
funding for the magistrates’ courts will in the future come entirely from central 
government.  Previously, 80% came from central government, 20% from the local 
authority.  
Sir Robin Auld’s review had suggested that the Judicial Studies Board oversee 
the training of magistrates.  This idea was not taken up in the Courts Bill or in the 
Criminal Justice Bill. Instead, a recent initiative, the Strengthened Role Project Plan is 
being pursued by the Judicial Studies Board.  This is to consider mechanisms for 
training “to achieve a greater consistency in the standards of training and of learning 




                                                 
55
  Section 7(7). 
56
  See C. Fairbairn and S. Broadbridge, The Courts Bill [HL] Bill 112 of 2002-2003, House of 
Commons Library Research Paper 03/52, 5 June 2003 p. 12-13.  The Commission of the Peace is the 
authority under which Justices of the Peace exercise their jurisdiction. There used to be local 
commission areas overseen by the Magistrates’ Courts Committee subdivided into Petty Sessional 
Divisions. Since the Courts Act 2003, magistrates are assigned to a particular area but have national 
jurisdiction, there now being a single Commission of the Peace for England and Wales. 
57
  Section 8.  
58
  Section 8(4) 
59
  Access to Justice Act 1999, section 78. This means that a District Judge may sit in any magistrates’ 
court throughout England and Wales. There used to be separate benches for Metropolitan (London) 
stipendiary magistrates and the provincial bench for the rest of England and Wales.  
60
 However, this newly created Inspectorate might be short-lived. The recent Police and Justice Bill 
introduced in the House of Commons on 25 January 2006 provides for its abolition under Clause 
29(1)(e) and for its replacement with a Chief Inspector for Justice, Community Safety and Custody, 
whose main role will be to inspect the operation of the courts system in England and Wales, the 
criminal justice system and the immigration enforcement system. This new Inspector will also replace 
the Chief Inspector of Prisons, the Inspectors of Constabulary, the Chief Inspector of the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the Inspectorate of the National Probation Service for England and Wales.  
61
  Section 65. 
62
  Para 5, p. 3. 
63
  This might also evidence early signs of a judicial career ladder being established. See Clare Dyer, 
“Falconer opens doors to judges in their 30s”, The Guardian newspaper of 1st July 2003. 
64
 Part 1 and Schedule 2. 
65
 “JSB’s Strengthened Role Project Plan”, (Judicial Studies Board, March 2004) (see 
http://www.jsboard.co.uk/magistrates/strengthened_role/index.htm.  
 8 
Promotion or demise of local justice?  
The recent moves to streamline local justice have not been received 
uncritically. One view is that this is the beginning of the decline of the lay magistracy.  
Lord Justice Auld in his review acknowledged that many magistrates believed that 
there was an agenda to “squeeze” lay magistrates out of the system
66
, but added that 
he knew of no such agenda
67
. The Lord Chancellor has been at pains to state his 
support for the lay Bench at each recent Annual General Meeting of the Magistrates’ 
Association
68
, but some doubt the truth of this. Writing in a national newspaper about 
amalgamation of benches and closure of some courts, one critic said: “The ‘efficient’, 
centralised anonymity which characterises and demoralises so much of modern 
Britain is increasingly the driver of modern justice.  Since so many of those who call 
the shots in all this are part of the deracinated metropolitan class, who have 
themselves lost much of their sense of locale and of the virtues of community life, 
then prospects for local justice look bleak.”
69
 
Duncan Webster, JP and Chief Executive of the Central Council of 
Magistrates’ Courts Committees spoke of the government going “down the road of 
abandoning local accountability”. He envisaged “a huge, centrally run monolithic 
agency, lacking any local input and accountability, which takes decisions without 




Another retired lay justice, Glenna Robson
71
 pointed to the growth in the 
numbers of District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts) - in August 2002 stated to be 103 
with 152 deputy District Judges - and the fact that District Judges (Magistrates’ 
Courts) are able to sit alone in the Youth Court.  She suggested that local inertia and 
unjustified self-satisfaction on the part of the lay magistrates may prove fatal to the 
lay magistracy. She quoted an anonymous civil servant, reported in a national 
newspaper
72
 as saying, in relation to a research project
73
conducted by Morgan and 
Russell:  
 
“What we expect this research to prove is that lay magistrates are at best 
inadequate and at worst appalling (…).we will probably achieve our goal by stealth 
rather than in a big bang reform but we must professionalise the magistrates’ courts or 
whatever replaces them.” 
 
Morgan and Russell and Lord Justice Auld were in favour of retaining the lay 
magistracy. Professor John Raine has acknowledged the “decisive conclusion of Auld 
in favour of the retention of the lay magistracy”
 74
, but nonetheless suggested that 
some of  Lord Justice Auld’s proposals, in particular a new unified court structure and 
                                                 
66
 Auld Review, Chapter  4, para. 12. 
67
 See Morgan, op. cit. at 308. 
68
 See The Magistrate (Winter edition) 2001 and 2002. 
69
 Andrew Phillips (Lord Sudbury, Liberal Democratic peer), “We must hold on to local justice”, (2 
December 2000), The Observer. 
70
 “Fighting the Threat to Local Justice”, (May 2002) The Magistrate 140. 
71
  See “The Lay Magistracy: No Time for Complacency”, (2002) 166 Justice of the Peace 624. 
72
  Sunday Telegraph, of 30 July 2000. 
73
 R. Morgan and N. Russell, The Judiciary in the Magistrates’ Courts, (Home Office and Lord 
Chancellor’s Department, 2000). 
74
 See “The Lay Magistracy after Auld: Safe as the Rock of Gibraltar?” (2002) 166 Justice of the Peace 
240. 
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a single supporting executive agency, would make the survival of the magistracy 
more difficult.  He identified three concerns in particular: 
- the recruitment of new magistrates being discouraged by terms and conditions of 
service because of greater remoteness from the local area and community;  
- more central control following the end of Magistrates’ Courts Committees; and   
 - difficulties flowing from the division of work between lay magistrates and District 
Judges.   
The result he foresaw was that the quality of local democratic participation 
and the degree of community orientation would be diminished. 
Rod Morgan, then Chief Inspector of Probation, spoke of the “intellectual 
asset stripping”
75
 which would follow from the creation of a middle tier of courts as 
recommended by Sir Robin Auld. Although that proposal was not enacted, it is 
nonetheless arguable that the ending of committal proceedings, and the end of 
magistrates sitting in the Crown Court dealing with appeals and sentences, together 
with the prospect of Deputy District Judges dealing with the more complex cases in 
the Magistrates’ Court could well contribute to the same effect. The lay bench may 
fear relegation to more routine, mundane cases.  This could lead to fewer applications 
to join the lay bench, and hence possibly to a lesser recruitment rate.  Resignations of 
existing magistrates were identified as another possibility by Lord Phillips of 
Sudbury:  
 
“Unless good justices of the peace have a good cross-section of cases, 
including some of the most difficult in terms of law, fact and judgment, they will 
simply walk away, as many of them have already done because of workload, court 






 expressed concern about the threat to the independence 
of criminal justice agencies if too much joint working and joint inspecting took place. 
All six Chief Inspectors of Crown Prosecution Service, Constabulary, Magistrates’ 
Courts Service, Prisons and Probation and Social Services have been persuaded to 
produce a joint report.  At the same time Rutherford noted the irritation with which 
ministers had greeted critical reports by the Chief Inspector of Prisons, Sir David 
Ramsbottom.  Professor Rutherford’s fear was that ‘joined up’ working may result in 
a dilution of necessary independence of the various agencies.
78
 
The larger issues are twofold – simply stated, but difficult to answer: What 
does ‘local’ justice mean? And do we want it?  Local justice can be criticised as 
“justice by geography”.  Why should two people be treated differently in relation to 
punishment for the same offence, or receive different chances of getting bail
79
 or legal 
representation merely because of the court culture in that area?  Recent research 
findings have indicated great differences of approach in different areas - or even in 
adjacent areas
80
.  The Home Secretary, speaking at the Justices’ Clerks Conference in 
2001 referred to figures of  20% sentenced to immediate custody for burglary in 
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 R. Morgan, op. cit. at 319. 
76
 HL Deb 9 Dec 2002 c50 
77
  See “The Limits to Joined-up Justice”, (2000) New Law Journal 672. 
78
  See Footnote 60, ante for current proposals for merging Inspectorates. 
79
 A. Hucklesby, “Court Culture: An Explanation of Variations in the Use of Bail by Magistrates’ 
Courts” 36 [1997] Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 129. 
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Association, Home Office 2002. 
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Teeside compared with 41% in Birmingham, and 3.5% receiving custodial sentences 
in Reading compared with 48% in Greenwich and Woolwich.
81
 
How good is “local” and how good is “lay”?  What might be the consequences 
of a more rational, national approach?  Much will depend on how the tensions 
between managerialism and the main object of the courts’ work are resolved. In the 
Foreword to a Howard League Working Party report, Andrew Rutherford wrote that 
“resolving the tensions between the demands of managerialism and those of justice is 
the greatest challenge facing the criminal justice system today.”
82
 Those words are as 
true today as they were well over a decade ago. 
The quality of summary justice as opposed to that relating to trial on 
indictment has not been the subject of research. It would be simplistic to attempt to 
compare the Crown Court with the magistrates’ courts too directly, since the 
workload of each is so very different, even though they overlap. Many offences dealt 
with in the magistrates’ courts are lesser offences, quite often being offences of strict 
liability, or regulatory offences.  Nevertheless, as Darbyshire pointed out
83
, the 
magistrates do still deal with quite serious offences, and offences involving not only 
the risk of custody for  a considerable time but also convictions which may have 
lifelong repercussions for a defendant’s reputation in the community and his or her 
future employment prospects. 
 
 
PART 2   JURISDICTION AND POWERS 
Originally, in 1361, Justices of the Peace had police powers which gave them 
the authority to arrest suspects, investigate alleged crimes and punish offenders. 
Subsequently, in the absence of an adequate system of local government, they were 
given administrative responsibilities which they exercised for centuries. In the 19
th
 
century, with the exception of liquor and gaming licensing, their administrative 
responsibilities were transferred to local authorities. Equally, they lost their policing 
role to local polices forces. Today, magistrates’ courts have jurisdiction and powers in 
criminal and civil matters.  
 
Criminal jurisdiction and powers 
Magistrates deal with about 95% of all prosecuted cases, the vast majority of 
which are dealt with without a trial by a guilty plea. Most offences are dealt with 




 some of 
which carry, at present, a penalty of up to six months’ imprisonment.   
Despite suggestions in favour of a general increase or decrease in summary 
jurisdiction, Lord Justice Auld could “discern no wide or well-based support for a 
change in the general limit of six months’ custody or £5,000 fine now applicable to 
District judges and magistrates alike” and recommended that there should be no 
general change in the level of summary jurisdiction of District Judges or 
magistrates
86
. However, Auld conceded that the “matter may need review in light of 
                                                 
81
  Home Office  Press Release 119/2002, 7 May 2002. 
82
 Howard League for Penal Reform, The Dynamics of Justice, a report of the Working Party on 
Criminal Justice Administration  (London: Howard League, 1993). 
83
 In "An Essay on the Importance and Neglect of the Magistracy",  [1997] Crim LR 627 at 630. 
84
 This competence is not exclusive however as some summary offences may go to Crown Courts with 
either way offences under s. 40 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
85
 Summary offences are created and defined by statute. There are thousands of different summary 
offences which include lesser road traffic offences, public order offences, common assault, etc. 
86
 See the Report, para. 20 at 101and 102.  
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the Halliday recommendations for the introduction of a new sentencing framework, 
including combined custody and community orders”
87
.  He also recommended the 
creation of an intermediate tier of the criminal court which would have jurisdiction to 
impose sentences of two years’ custody
88
. Unconvinced that there was a strong case to 
justify introducing a new tier, the Government remained committed to “legislate to 
increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 12 months and to allow (it) to increase 
them up to 18 months, depending on the results of evaluations, and taking account of 
any additional training requirements.”
89
  Section 132 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
1980 provides that magistrates shall not impose imprisonment for less than five days. 
This remains unchanged under Section 154(7) of the Criminal Justice Act. 
Under Section 31(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, magistrates had no 
power to impose imprisonment (or youth custody) for more than six months. Under 
Section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act, this limit is brought up to twelve months
90
. 
Moreover, clause 139 of the Criminal Justice Bill gave the Secretary of State the 
power to increase by way of order that maximum term of imprisonment to eighteen 
months but this clause was dropped in the Criminal Justice Act. 
In the case of consecutive terms of imprisonments, i.e. where the defendant is 
convicted of two or more summary offences at the same hearing, under section 133(1) 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the magistrates cannot impose a sentence amounting to 
more than six months in custody. This sentence could rise to twelve months, however, 
in the case of offences triable “either way” (Section 133(2) Magistrates’ Courts Act). 
Under Section 155(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, this period of six month is extended 
to sixty-five weeks i.e. fifteen months
91
.    
Committal proceedings and mode of trial 
Magistrates sitting as examining magistrates traditionally determine whether 
the prosecution have established a prima facie case to be committed for trial at the 
Crown Court. This power was exercised in the case of “indictable only” and “either 
way” offences. However, proceedings for committal for trial for “indictable only” 
offences ceased in 2001. Such cases are now automatically sent to the Crown Court 
for trial.  
Section 17 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act confers upon magistrates’ 
jurisdiction to try “either way” offences
92
. In the cases that are triable “either way”, 
                                                 
87
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 See Chapter 7, paragraphs 21 to 37 of the Auld Report. 
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 See Justice for All, para. 4.19. 
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 However, the power of magistrates to impose a term of imprisonment for non-payment of a fine, or 
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91
 Clause 139 of the Bill also provided that the Secretary of State could by order increase that term of 
imprisonment to twenty-four months. This Clause was dropped in the Criminal Justice Act. 
92
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abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of any offence triable either way. 
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the procedure for determining the mode of trial – i.e. trial by magistrates or by judge 
and jury in the Crown Court - is provided for under Sections 18 – 26. This jurisdiction 
as a whole remains untouched by the Criminal Justice Act or the Courts Act. Section 
41 of the Criminal Justice Act on allocation of offences triable “either way”, and 
sending cases to the Crown Court simply refers to Schedule 3, which amends those 
provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. Notably, a new section 19 of the 1980 Act 
on decision as to allocation, requires the courts to give the prosecution an opportunity 
to inform the court of the defendant’s previous convictions, if any, and give the 
prosecution and the defendant an opportunity to make representations as to which 
mode of trial would be more suitable. Furthermore, in making a decision of allocation, 
the court must consider those representations, the adequacy of its sentencing powers 
and take account of the any allocation guidelines to be made under section 170 of the 
Criminal Justice Act by the new Sentencing Guidelines Council
93
.  
Under a replacement section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, when in force, 
if the court decides that summary trial is more suitable, it must explain to the 
defendant in ordinary language its decision and ask him whether he consents to such 
decision or prefers to be tried on indictment. It must also tell the defendant that, in the 
case of a section 224 specified offence
94
, if tried summarily and convicted by the 
court, he may still be committed for sentence to the Crown Court (new section 20(2) 
Magistrates’ Courts Act).  The defendant may also request an “indication of sentence” 
i.e. an indication of whether the court is more likely to impose a custodial or non-
custodial sentence should the defendant be tried summarily on the basis of a guilty 
plea. The court has discretion to give or not give such indication. If the court gives an 
indication on request, it must give the defendant the opportunity to reconsider the 
defendant’s original plea (new section 20(5) & (6)). 
There also exists the option for the defendant to choose to be tried by the 
Crown Court
95
 or for the magistrates to transfer the case to the Crown Court if they 
are of the opinion that the offence is so serious that it requires greater punishment 
than they can impose, or in the case of a violent or sexual offence
96
, that a term of 
imprisonment longer than they can impose is necessary to protect the public from 
serious harm from the offender
97
. 
Under section 19, as amended, of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, the courts could 
decide that trial on indictment appears more suitable in which case magistrates shall 
send the case to the Crown Court under section 51 of the Criminal and Disorder Act 
                                                 
93
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96
 These are defined under Section 31 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
97




 as amended by paragraph 18 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act
99
. 
Under those new provisions, the case is simply “sent” rather than “transferred” as was 
previously the case. Proceedings for committal for trial for “either way” offences will 
no longer take place. 
Regarding sending young offenders for trial
100
, the replacement section 51 of 
the Crime and Disorder Act makes a clearer distinction between the defendant as an 
adult and the defendant as a child or a young person.  The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
also extends the circumstances under which young offenders are to be sent to the 
Crown Court for trial. It is no longer necessary for a young offender to have 
committed an offence jointly with an adult for his case to be sent to the Crown Court. 
Under the new section 51A, offences involving children and young persons will be 
sent for trial where: the offence is one of homicide or the offence is one under section 
51A of the Firearms Act 1968
101
; the offence is a serious offence that attracts 
sentencing under section 91 of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000
102
; the 
offence is a specified offence within the meaning of section 224
103
 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 and could meet the criteria for the imposition of a sentence laid 
down under section 226(3) (detention for life or detention for public prosecution   for 
serious offences committed by those under 18) or 228(2) (extended sentence for 
certain violent or sexual offences committed by persons under 18) of this Act
104
; the 
offence is a summary offence punishable with imprisonment or obligatory or 




Committal for sentencing  
The White Paper proposed that when magistrates heard a case and convicted 
the defendant, they should sentence him themselves and that committal for sentencing 
should be abolished
106
 so that “the defendants will always know the maximum 
sentence they could incur if they enter a not guilty plea but do not exercise the right to 
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elect trial by jury.”
107
 Because experience tells that defendants will be expected to be 
less likely to choose trial on indictment in the Crown Court if they know they will get 
a lesser penalty in the magistrates’ court, the Government’s expectations from this 
change was a reduction “in the number of cases going to the Crown Court which can 
be dealt with more effectively and appropriately
108
 in the magistrate’s courts, and in 
the abuse of the right to elect for jury trial.”
109
  
Under new sections 3 and 4 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 
as amended by paragraphs 21- 28 of Schedule 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the 
powers of committal to the Crown Court for sentence of either-way offences are no 
longer available unless a guilty plea has been indicated.  
 
Territorial jurisdiction 
Under sections 1 and 2 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the territorial 
criminal jurisdiction of magistrates was limited to offences committed in their 
commission area and offences committed by people who live in their commission 
area. They can also issue summonses and warrants in respect of offences committed 
in their commission area. In the White paper, the Government proposed that lay 
magistrates have national jurisdiction to “(…) allow the straightforward and speedy 
transfer of cases from one magistrates’ court to another, which will assist in 
conducting trials at the most convenient local site, and (…) deliver greater 
consistency in procedures between the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court.”
110
; 
and that they be deployed more flexibly so as to, for example, allow a Circuit Judge 
sitting in a Crown Court “to hear a summary offence that became attached, without 
the case having to go back to a magistrates’ court.”
111
. According to the Lord 
Chancellor, this change would “bring the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court 
closer together. Closer integration will remove unnecessary geographical boundaries, 
allowing cases to be heard at the most convenient location, taking account of the 
needs of victims, witnesses and defendants, and helping to reduce delay. It will bring 
about greater consistency in practice and procedure between the criminal courts; and 
it will remove statutory restrictions, allowing for more flexible use of the court estate 
and more effective deployment of judges and magistrates.”
112
 Under sections 43 and 
44 of the Courts Act 2003, which amend sections 1 and 2 of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Act, magistrates can now issue summonses and warrants in respect of any offence and 
any offender, and try any summary offences. Section 46 of the 2003 Act, which adds 
a new section 27A to the Magistrates’ Courts Act
113
, also enables magistrates to 
transfer criminal cases to other magistrates’ courts, either on the application of a party 
or on their own motion. Such transfer can occur before or after the beginning of the 
trial of or inquiry into the offence, or after the court has begun to hear the evidence 
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 Speech made during the second reading debate in the House of Lords, HL Deb 9 Dec. 2002 c14. 
113
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and the parties, in which case the court to which the matter has been transferred must 




Civil jurisdiction and powers 
Although magistrates’ courts are mostly known as criminal courts, they also 
have a significant civil jurisdiction. They sit as family proceedings courts and hear 
family cases under the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 and 
the Children Act 1989. They also have powers of recovery in relation to community 
charges and council taxes. Furthermore, magistrates used to grant, renew and revoke 
licences for selling intoxicating liquor. This primary responsibility for liquor licensing 
has now passed to the local authority under the Licensing Act 2003.
115
 Under this new 
regime, magistrates are involved as sentencers and as an appellate tribunal against 
local authority decisions.  
Finally, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act 2003
116
, magistrates have powers to issue anti-social behaviour orders. 
Those orders are civil by nature under section 53 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 
but their breach is a criminal offence which could carry imprisonment.
117
 
Section 52 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 restricted the magistrates’ civil 
jurisdiction to matters arising in their commission area and did not allow them to 
transfer civil proceedings, other than family proceedings, from one court to another. 
As with criminal proceedings, the Courts Act 2003 now gives magistrates national 
jurisdiction to issue summonses and deal with complaints (s. 47), and power to 
transfer civil proceedings, with the exception of family proceedings (s. 48)
118
. 
Family proceedings and criminal cases dealt with in youth courts can only be 
heard by magistrates specifically authorised by law and trained for that purpose. The 
Government has sought to reform this system and, in its White Paper, made the 
following proposal: 
 
“We will reform the system by which lay magistrates are authorised to hear 
youth and family cases. We propose that the system of ‘panels’ will be replaced by a 
system of personal authorisation, so that a magistrate selected and trained for 
specialist work need no longer wait months to be elected to their new local panel. The 
system will continue to operate locally, with input from local magistrates, but the 




                                                 
114
 The powers to transfer criminal proceedings must be exercised in accordance with any directions 
given under section 30(3) of the Courts Act 2003 by the Lord Chancellor as to the distribution and 
transfer of the general business of Magistrates’ Courts. This would, in particular, mean that when 
deciding whether to transfer a case or not, magistrates would have to take account of the witnesses’ 
needs. 
115
  See A. Mimmack, “Licensing – The New Regime”, (Oct. 2003) Magistrate 283; R. Newman 
“Licensing for the 21
st
 Century” (2005) NLJ 1802 and R. Light “The Licensing Act 2003: Liberal 
Constraint?” (2005) 68(2) MLR  268.      
116
 See S. Jones, “Taking a Stand” (2003) NLJ 1248; L. Casey, “Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour” 
(January 2004) Magistrate 12; P. Tain, “Curing Anti-Social Behaviour” (2004) SJ 715. 
117
 However, in  R (On the application of McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1AC 787, the 
House of Lords held that the standard of proof should be the criminal standard, given the potential 
sanction of up to five years' imprisonment for breach of the order. 
118
 As with criminal proceedings, the powers to transfer civil proceedings must be exercised in 
accordance with any directions given under section 30(3) of the Courts Act 2003 by the Lord 
Chancellor as to the distribution and transfer of the general business of Magistrates’ Courts (s. 48(4)). 
119
 Justice For All, para. 4.40 
 16 
This proposed reform materialised in the Courts’ Act 2003 which set out the 
framework whereby lay magistrates and district judges are authorised to hear family 
proceedings (s. 49) and youth cases (s. 50). A justice of the peace is not qualified to 
sit as a member of the family proceedings court (s. 49, which amends s. 67 of the 
1980 Act) or as a member of a youth court (s. 50 which amends s. 45 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933 on the constitution of youth courts), unless he has an 
authorisation granted by the Lord Chancellor or a person acting on his behalf. 
However, as a consequence of section 66 of the Courts’ Act, the members of 
the higher judiciary have also jurisdiction to hear such cases. It clearly provides that 
every holder of a judicial office, such as a High Court judge or deputy judge, a Circuit 
judge or deputy judge and a recorder, has the powers of a justice of the peace who is a 
District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) in relation to criminal causes and matters and 








PART 3   ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 
AND THE COURTS’ ACT ON SUMMARY JUSTICE 
The crucial question now is whether increased centralisation of the 
administration of summary justice will attain the desired objectives of efficiency, 
homogeneity, and consistency.  A further and broader question is what effect the 
striving for those aims may have on democratic involvement in the criminal justice 
system, and on the fundamental question of the quality of justice.  The effects of the 
politicisation of criminal justice and the rise in the prison population are significant 
background issues. 
 
Attainment of the desired objectives 
Efficiency 
It is hoped that the changes will lead to less delay in the system.
122
 The ending 
of committal proceedings should lead to swifter resolution of cases. District judges 
work more quickly than lay benches.
123
 Changing the way appeals are dealt with 
should simplify practice, as will the ending (in most cases) of the procedure of 
committals for sentence, and the increasing of the magistrates’ sentencing powers. 
The proposed abolition of committal for sentence was generally welcomed. 
For instance the view of Liberty, an independent human rights organisation, was that 
they “support(ed) the proposal that magistrates should no longer be able to commit 
cases they have heard to the Crown Court for sentence. Once the magistrates have 
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accepted jurisdiction it is counterproductive to allow defendants who plead or are 
found guilty to be committed to the Crown Court to face longer sentences.”
124
  
Equally Justice, an all-party law reform and human rights organisation, was of 
the opinion that the White Paper’s aim (in extending the maximum custodial sentence 
available to magistrates and in abolishing the power to commit to the Crown Court for 
sentence) was to “reduce the number of cases going to the Crown Court which can be 
dealt ‘more effectively and appropriately in the magistrates’ courts’(…) (since) most 
either-way cases are dealt with by magistrates (…) (and), after the introduction of the 
plea before venue procedure and the case law which followed, the number of cases 
committed to the Crown Court has begun to fall.”
125
 
However, Justice has expressed concern at the idea of increasing magistrates’ 
sentencing powers up to 18 months on the ground that defendants do not have the 
same protection as in Crown Courts and that “there are fundamental problems with 
decision-making and the quality of the legal advice to the magistrates in the 
magistrates’ courts”.
126
  Justice also fears that an increase in sentencing powers will  
lead to a general increase in all sentences given. This fear is echoed by the Bar 
Council which believes that “the lasting effect of such a change would be to increase 
prison population”.
127
 As the Bar Council pointed out, the Halliday report 
128
 have 
shown that “magistrates are the prime reason for an increase in the use of short 
sentences” despite the fact that these do not work.  
What is more of a matter for concern is the existing substantial disparity 
between magistrates’ courts over sentencing. Increasing their sentencing powers will 
certainly not solve but rather accentuate this fundamental problem.  Both the White 
Paper and the Auld Review failed to tackle these fundamental problems, which can 
only affect public confidence further. As suggested by the Bar Council, it would 




In the meantime, it may be that the extension of the magistrates’ jurisdiction 
will keep cases down in the summary courts – only time will tell how the magistrates 
exercise their discretion to accept jurisdiction in particular cases. It will depend on 
how magistrates in fact react in terms of assuming jurisdiction.
130
   
 
Homogeneity 
Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts are now managed together.  As a result, 
magistrates will have less significant presence and hence potentially less influence in 
the new Court Boards than they used to have in the Magistrates’ Courts Committees.  
There will be less room for differences in practical approach between individual 
magistrates’ courts administration. The move towards conformity may already have 
begun as a result of: 
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- having fewer Justices’ Clerks  and by amalgamation of benches,
131
 
- target setting and establishment of performance indicators,  
- the institution of the Magistrates’ Courts’ Inspectorate with ability to go into any                                                                       
court, and gather information across the country and  
- the strengthening of the role of Justices Chief Executive - especially when they no 
longer needed to be qualified as Justices’ Clerks.  
The ending of the role of the Justices’ Chief Executive 
132
 and arrival of new 
civil servants to replace this role must increase central control even more. Although 
the legislation still makes clear the judicial role of the Justices’ Clerk is to be 
maintained
133
, it is arguable that the position of a civil servant is capable of being 
viewed as less independent than that of a person who is not a civil servant.  
One would expect the result to be more uniformity of practice, more 
monitoring, and more awareness in central government of how the system is 
operating.  Consequently, one would expect a greater capacity for central government 
to control what happens in the courts.  The notion of managerialism fits this picture 
well.  However, as Zedner points out "the nature of managerialism has (…) 
withdrawn attention from the questions of larger purpose to focus instead on the 





As far as consistency is concerned, it may be expected that joint 
administration of Crown and magistrates’ courts will lead to uniformity of approach.  
Presumably, consistency of provision will be promoted by the implementation of the 
new legislation. The drawback of seeking consistency of provision may be that 
accessibility of justice in localities (already lessened by closure of courts) will 
continue to decrease, if small courts are closed or amalgamated with other courts
135
.   
This may be felt most acutely in rural areas, where poor (or no) public transport could 
further deny citizens practical access to the courts, and hence affect the 'local' nature 
of the availability of justice. 
Consistency in quality of justice delivered is more elusive.  However 
streamlined the organisation of the courts may be, the most critical issue - the quality 





The effect of the criminal justice reform on the democratic involvement in the 
criminal justice system 
Will the new arrangements lead to more locally accountable administration of 
justice?  
The Criminal Justice Act dramatically increases the magistrates' powers of 
punishment, and hence their jurisdiction. Will this lead to the exercise of more power? 
Will the lay bench be strengthened or threatened by the operation of the new system?   
                                                 
131
 There are "about" 80 Clerks to the Justices in February 2006, as opposed to 200 in 1996 
(information from the Justices' Clerks' Society, February 2006). 
132
 By the Courts’ Act 2003, section 6. 
133
 By virtue of  the Courts Act 2003 section  29. 
134
 Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press,2004 pp256-7 
135
 It may be the case however that closure of courts may be avoided in some instances by joint use of 
court accommodation by magistrates and Crown Court. See Lord Woolf, “Achieving Criminal Justice”, 
(February 2003) The Magistrate 42. 
136
 A. Herbert ., op. cit. at 325. 
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Certainly the local nature of summary justice will change since lay magistrates 
are to be appointed to a single Commission Area
137
, and also as District Judges now 
belong to a single bench for England and Wales.   Much will depend on what the 
magistrates do with their new powers to hear cases carrying greater potential 
sentences and how central government uses its new powers. Other factors include the 
success in recruiting new lay magistrates.  The Lord Chancellor in his address to the 
Magistrates’ Association in October 2004 admitted that the National Strategy for the 
Recruitment of Lay Magistrates had not been as successful as had been hoped: “I 
know in many courts, recruitment is a particularly sore issue. Courts where, despite 
the enthusiasm, dedication, and commitment of the magistrates’ bench, they are 
struggling because there simply aren’t enough magistrates.”
138
 
This concern about recruitment of new magistrates was echoed by Rachel 
Lipscomb, JP and chairman of the Magistrates’ Association Council, who 
acknowledged that “(l)ast May in 2004 (the magistracy) had reached a point on 
recruitment where (...it was…) facing serious risks in the future”. However she was 
confident that the new Government strategy to increase recruitment might possibly 
turn the trend round. 
139
 Despite this spell of optimism, it is very unclear how this new 
strategy will effectively solve the problem of recruitment and retention of magistrates. 
In particular, the main problem facing the Government is to encourage applications 
from under-represented ethnic and lower socio-economic groups of the society. This 
has been a long-standing problem and no easy solution is likely to be reached in the 
near future. Besides, the public profile of being a magistrate is not particularly great 
among those groups. Attracting the younger generation might prove more problematic 
than it might seem at first glance, especially as the most educated section of it often 
will have to cope with high levels of debt incurred from expenditure in higher 
education. Equally, encouraging employers to release their employees for their 
magisterial duties through, notably, tax relief or payments to companies
140
, might not 
                                                 
137
 See Section 7 and Sections 43 and 44 of the Courts Act 2003.  In practice, most cases will continue 
to be tried in the court that serves the area where the offence was committed.  See Peter Hungerford – 
Welch, Criminal Litigation and Sentencing, (Cavendish:  2004) at 180. 
138
 The Magistrates’ Association http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2004/lc261004.htm 
The Lord Chancellor announced a programme of work called “Supporting Magistrates’ Courts To 
Provide Justice”, the key areas of which he identifies as ensuring magistrates are respected, valued and 
their orders obeyed; public confidence increased; connecting courts with their communities – in a 
sound bite “Connected, Respected,  Effective.”   
Regarding recruitment, it is suggested that more should be done to encourage applications for 
magisterial appointment, in particular from under-represented groups. To achieve this objective, many 
routes may be followed, notably: raising the public profile of magistrates; encouraging employers  
through legislation to release employees for the performance of their magisterial duties;  making the 
process of becoming a magistrate easier and less daunting for citizens and speeding up their 
appointment process;  increasing awareness of the role of magistrates in schools and universities; 
improving the allowance system and offering more incentives (e.g. in the form of daily rates or tax 
breaks) notably to appeal to lower socio-economic groups; approaching jury members to become 
magistrates. Equally, more should be done to encourage current magistrates to remain on the bench. 
Notably, a scheme offering reward or recognition for long service could be created; magistrates could 
be allowed to use their JP title more liberally with the view to giving them more recognition in society; 
ending forced retirement at 70 or use magistrates over 70 as mentors or to carry out appraisals; 
improving the payment of expenses; relieving magistrates of the administrative burdens so that they 
can concentrate on sittings; and creating a “Diploma in Criminal Law”, on completion of which a 
magistrate could qualify for consideration for appointment as Deputy District Judge.   
139
 Speech at the DCA Conference “Magistrates’ Courts and Local Justice – Connected, Respected, 
Effective”, (London: 14 March 2005), see http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2005/lc140305.htm 
140
 As suggested in the response paper to the Government Strategy (March 2005) at 20. 
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prove a sufficient incentive and might not lift employee’s fears of being prejudiced in 
promotion or in appointment. Although being a brave effort to broaden the 
recruitment base, the proposal to leaflet jurors on completion of their jury service 
inviting them to consider applying to become a magistrate, may only address the 
problem in a very limited way. 
It was acknowledged in 2005 that the magistrates’ courts may have a problem 
of coping with an increasing workload:  
 
"The Government estimates that over the coming three years, the courts can 
expect to see an increase in workload of over 20%.  The Government's target is to 
bring 1.25 million offences to justice by 2007/8. Currently there are not enough 
magistrates to deal with all these additional cases. There is also a big 'cliff edge' 






The operation of summary justice in England and Wales has been and will be 
significantly altered by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Courts Act 2003.  
Certain changes are already apparent, in particular, with respect to the general 
organisation of the system, showing a clear move towards more central control by the 
Government. This is illustrated by the creation of a single commission area for 
England and Wales, replacing the old local commission areas; by the establishment of 
Her Majesty’s Courts Service (HMCS) to administer inter alia Crown and 
magistrates’ courts; by the abolition of the Magistrates’ Courts’ Committees and their 
replacement by local Courts’ Boards; and the creation of a national Inspectorate of 
Court Administration overseeing both Crown and Magistrates’ Courts. Even further 
amalgamation of Inspectorates is now being envisaged
142
.  Furthermore, the financing 
of summary justice is now entirely a matter for central Government.    
With regard to the magistrates’ courts’ jurisdiction, the emphasis has mainly 
been put on keeping the work in the magistrates’ courts. Increasing their sentencing 
powers and reducing committals for trial and sentence will lead to a reduction in jury 
trials. As a consequence, it seems that the profile of magistrates’ courts’ workload 
will alter.  
Efficiency, homogeneity and consistency were the major stated aims of this 
reform. As argued above, there is no doubt that the reforms are likely to have the 
desired effect in terms of streamlining summary justice and, consequently, reducing 
its financial burden. However doubts can be raised as to whether these reforms would 
equally lead to greater democratic involvement and greater public confidence in 
summary justice.  
It is not surprising therefore that the Department for Constitutional Affairs had 
to devise further strategies, as developed in the paper “Supporting Magistrates’ Courts 
to Provide Justice”, to 'ensure that summary justice is better connected to the 
community, is more valued and respected and is more effective in dealing with cases'. 
As pointed out by Lord Falconer in “Doing Law Differently”
143
, “(m)agistrates are 
often the vital link between the court and community, as magistrates are drawn from 
                                                 
141
 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Regulatory Impact Assessment, Supporting Magistrates to 
Provide Justice,   7 November 2005. See http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2005/lc071105.htm 
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  See Footnote 59, ante. 
143
 Department for Constitutional Affairs Paper, April 2006 at 6. See 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/dept/doinglawdiff.htm 
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the local area and are able to bring a wide range of experience and an understanding 
of local issues”. However this laudatory attitude of the Government towards 
magistrates has not stopped it from considering a fresh alternative approach to the 
delivery of summary justice, inspired by a “problem-solving approach” experimented 
and developed in New York. This new approach to community justice, which focuses 
more on sentencing rather than the trial process itself, has materialised in the piloting 
of a new Community Justice Centre in North Liverpool.  The underlying idea of this 
scheme is to bring justice closer to the community by combining into one centre the 
sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts, youth courts and Crown Courts with a 
whole range of on-site services such as victim support, drug addiction services, debt 
counselling and housing services.  According to the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs paper, the main purpose of the Centre is to “tackle anti-social behaviour and 
the crime associated with it”.
144
  The Government is also applying this so-called 
“problem-solving approach” to other areas of summary justice such as domestic 
violence and drug cases by having specialist courts, sitting within the magistrates’ 
courts, to deal specifically with such cases in a more efficient way. The basic 
philosophy of this approach seems to be to bring together within those courts the 
necessary expertise to address the underlying problems in each case as part of the 
sentencing process. 
This new approach sounds very appealing but it remains to be seen whether 
and how it will make summary justice speedier, simpler and more responsive to the 
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 Ibidem at 7. 
